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Abstract—Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (DSS) aims to pro-
vide opportunistic access to under-utilised spectrum in cellular
networks for secondary network operators. In this paper we
propose an algorithm using stochastic and optimisation models
to borrow spectrum bandwidths under the assumption that more
resources exist for secondary access than the secondary network
demand by considering a merchant mode. The main aim of
the paper is to address the problem of spectrum borrowing in
DSS environments, where a secondary network operator aims to
borrow the required spectrum from multiple primary network
operators to achieve a maximum profit under specific grade of
service (GoS) and budget restriction. We assume that the primary
network operators offer spectrum access opportunities with
variable number of channels (contiguous and/or non-contiguous)
at variable prices. Results obtained are then compared with
results derived from an algorithm in which spectrum borrowing
are random. Comparisons showed that the gain in the results
obtained from our proposed stochastic-optimisation framework
is significantly higher than random counterpart.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular data networks have recently witnessed rapid
growth, especially due to the emergence of smartphones which
led to an ever-increasing demand for wireless services in cer-
tain licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands [1]. To meet the
growing traffic demand, significant technology improvements
to enhance spectral efficiency is required. Static partitioning of
spectrum, for example, has significant operational implications
(e.g., pseudo scarcity of the available radio spectrum) which
have been identified by extensive spectrum utilisation mea-
surements in Europe and the USA [2]. These measurements
show that a large part of the radio spectrum which is allocated
to cellular use are quite well utilised but the utilisation varies
dramatically over time and space. Such variation of spectrum
utilisation causes the so-called spectrum holes.
The current static spectrum management must give way to
a new approach that breaks down artificial spectrum access
barriers and enables networks and their subscribers to dynam-
ically access the spectrum [3], [4], [5]. As a response, for
example, in the UK, there are plans for spectrum liberalisation
between operators with different spectrum holdings [6]. Lib-
eralisation of spectrum in the hands of the incumbent holders,
and mandatory spectrum release, means some liberalised spec-
trum ends up in the hands of a third party for secondary use.
It is also possible that spectrum will be redistributed not only
because of such a mandate, but also as a result of secondary
market trading [7], [8], [9], [1]. Such secondary trading of
spectrum will enhance the overall spectrum utilisation. As
a result, service providers would be allowed to release their
under-utilised commodities to the potential buyers [10], [11].
With the large number of service providers in the mobile
cellular networks industry, each with their own policy and
strategy, a variety of spectrum opportunities could be available
for secondary use. To this end, in order to distinguish between
options of different bandwidth releases, incumbent holders of
spectrum licenses may broadcast information in relation to
these available bandwidths for possible leasing to secondary
operators [12]. Part of the information broadcasted by the
incumbent spectrum holders are in the form of available spec-
trum for access size, location boundaries, maximum transmit
power, duration of the lease and admission cost [13].
Operators aim to provide a stable GoS to their respective
users, even if it would incur additional cost. However, in a sce-
nario where the number of wireless cellular operators is high,
making dynamic, on-demand and correct choice of acquiring
additional bandwidths can result in profit maximisation for a
given operator, especially when operators provide service for
large territories.
In general, this paper focuses on the predicted future
demand for mobile data services which may be provided
using liberalised spectrum and spectrum trading [14], [15],
[16]. Given a market scenario and other inputs, we propose
a technical algorithm with the aim to optimise the profit
of secondary operators, which are likely to be achieved by
an operator with a given number of cells. We also evaluate
spectrum borrowing scenarios by incorporating a large number
of cells. Major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• a novel purchase approach for dynamic spectrum sharing
(DSS) network is proposed in the presence of multiple
primary service operators. We introduce an optimisation
problem in merchant mode DSS and we solve the problem
by using stochastic modelling and mathematical program-
ming,
• the robustness of the proposed algorithm is investigated
in the presence of large number of cells and various types
of spectrum bands and the proposed algorithms compared
with random borrowing algorithm. Comparisons showed
a substantial gain over the random borrowing algorithms
and
• incorporation of the proposed model will complement
the well studied auction mode spectrum trading schemes,
while preparing automation of licensing by frequency
regulatory bodies.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature, a great number of studies has appeared
in recent years on the design of dynamic spectrum sharing
within cellular networks. Interests in this context include
secondary leasing and pricing strategies among incumbent
spectrum license holders, secondary operators and secondary
users. These prior studies mainly focused on approaches using
auction mode and game theory to implement the spectrum
pricing and allocation schemes by taking into account the
variation of the networks demands and constraints such as
power, price and interference [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22].
In [23], the authors proposes a multiple-dimension auc-
tioning mechanism through a broker to facilitate an efficient
secondary spectrum market. In [24] a knapsack based auction
model that dynamically allocates spectrum to the wireless
service providers (WSPs) such that revenue and spectrum
usage are maximised. A dynamic pricing strategy for the
service providers is also proposed. Auction schemes where
a central clearing authority auctions spectrum to bidders,
while explicitly accounting for communication constraints is
proposed in [13]. The used techniques are related to the
posterior matching scheme, which is used in systems with
channel output feedback. While in [25], spectrum auctions
in a dynamic setting where secondary users can change their
valuations based on their experiences with the channel quality
was studied. Price-based DSS has also been investigated from
the business perspective [26], [7]. For example, In [27] An
extensive business portfolio for heterogeneous networks is
presented to analyse the benefits due to multi-operator coop-
eration for spectrum sharing. High resolution pricing models
are developed to dynamically facilitate price adaptation to the
system State. In [28], a quality-aware dynamic pricing algo-
rithm (QADP) which maximises the overall network revenue
while maintaining the stability of the network was studied.
The vast majority of the aforementioned studies consider
competitive market scenarios and therefore auction and game
theory have been discussed to develop DSS strategies. By
using the same assumption, pricing in the context of DSS has
mainly been considered from the spectrum owners perspective
to maximise their revenues [26], [21], [29]. However, when the
number of available bandwidths from multiple license owners
is higher than SNO’s demand, then auction mode is not always
the best strategy. This is because the number of bidders might
be too small and the best selling price can not be achieved for
the license owners by using auction mode. A more realistic
and pragmatic model in this case is a merchant mode, which to
the best of the authors’ knowledge, has not been investigated
in the context of DSS. Moreover, spectrum borrowing when
considering budget restrictions has not been addressed. Also,
there is currently no published work, which attempted to
study the profit maximisation in merchant mode with target
performance. Thus, the problem that we formulate and solve
substantially differ from those available in the literature.
The paper is organised as follows: the proposed dynamic
spectrum management model is described in Section III.
Section IV addresses the problem of spectrum allocation in
homogeneous cellular networks and describes our mathemat-
ical programming formulations to the problem. In Section V,
we present our findings. Finally, Section VI summarises our
conclusions.
III. DYNAMIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT MODEL
A. System overview
We consider a cellular network consists of one secondary
network operator (SNO) and N , with size |N | = N , denote
the set of primary network operators (PNOs) serving a region
R, see Figure 1. Let L, with size |L| = L, be the set of cells
in the region. The operators consist of base stations and Radio
Network Controller (RNC). The main functions of the RNC
are to monitor base stations and to assign resources for the air
interface. Due to spectrum liberalisation, the PNOs |N | will
have the freedom to lease their spectrum bandwidths to the
SNO. Leasing spectrum bandwidths to SNO would mean that
the secondary system will have to pay a certain compensation
to the primary system for using the spectrum bandwidths,
and naturally the amount of compensation can be expected
to be proportional to the amount of allowed spectrum leasing
by the primary system. We assume the compensation paid to
the PNO is in form of monetary value. The PNOs broadcast
specific information about their available bands for leasing and
admission cost (per unit bandwidth) at each cell i ∈ L on fixed
identical intervals (e.g., every 2 hours). More specifically, the
PNOs only grants a time-bound lease to the SNOs and the
lease conditions may specify additional parameters, such as
the extent of spatial region for spectrum use and maximum
power. The compliant use of leased spectrum requires the SNO
to return the spectrum to the PNO at the end of the lease
interval.
B. Spectrum trading
We consider a spectrum market based on merchant mode
where PNOs independently determine the size of the available
spectrum for lease along with the associated monetary value.
The price of the available primary spectrum can be determined
by estimating the utilisation and demand in time and space
[30]. The available number of channels and the associated
prices are then advertised according to a take-it or leave-it
policy. No negotiation or bidding is conducted among network
operators. Merchant mode is appropriate when the demand
from the SNO is less than the available spectrum [4]. For
analytical purposes we have evaluated the proposed algorithms
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Fig. 1: Service operators sharing network
even for the case where the demand is higher than the available
spectrum, but only in a fraction of the controlled cells.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Considering the system model described in the previous
section, the problem now becomes how the SNO acquires
additional spectrum from PNOs. The spectrum borrowing
for an SNO can be performed by considering the following
objective:
• borrow the required spectrum from multiple PNOs to
achieve a specific grade of service for SNO under maxi-
mum and budget restrictions.
In principle, the SNO’s objective is to maximise revenue
as well as to maximise utility to the end users. We formulate
the problem as a finite horizon nonlinear stochastic program
whose computation time is polynomial in the input size.
A. Modelling assumptions
We identify the part of network information which is
assumed to be known to the SNO:
• arrival rate of the SNO at ith cell for jth type of spectrum
band λi j , ∀i, j,
• service rate of the SNO at ith cell for jth type of spectrum
band µi j , ∀i, j,
• available bandwidth of the SNO at ith cell for jth type
of spectrum band wi j , ∀i, j,
• borrowing cost of the SNO for unit bandwidth from
the PNOs at ith cell for jth type of spectrum band
ci j k, ∀i, j, k (which are assumed to be announced peri-
odically by the PNOs),
• allocated budget for borrowing bandwidths to the SNO
at ith cell for jth type of spectrum band from the PNOs
bi j , ∀i, j,
• available bandwidth of the kth PNO at ith cell for jth
type of spectrum band ai j k, ∀i, j, k, (which are assumed
to be announced periodically by the PNOs), and
• expected profit of the SNO at ith cell for jth type of
spectrum band for borrowing unit bandwidth from kth
PNO αi j k, ∀i, j, k.
Time is divided into equal-length slots T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. At
each time slot t ∈ T the process of channel borrowing is
repeated. We use the time indicator (t) to emphasise the
vectors dependancy in time. Trading of bandwidth is done
between primary and secondary providers separately in each
of successive time windows of a particular duration. Hence-
forth, we focus on the the process of channel borrowing and
optimisation in a single window.
B. Notations used:
Let us define the following quantities which are used later in
mathematical programming problems (Problem 1 and Problem
2):
ci j k (t) B cost of unit bandwidth to be borrowed from kth
PNO for j type resource at ith cell during time interval t,
where ci j k (t) ∈ R
L×Ni j
≥0 .
xi j k (t) B unit of spectrum bandwidths (or sub-bands) to be
borrowed from kth PNO for j type resource at ith cell during
time interval t, where xi j k (t) ∈ R
L×Ni j
≥0 .
θi j k (t) B PNOs intrinsic quality (e.g., the extent of the
coverage area and/or maximum allowable transmit power),
where {θi j1, θi j2, . . . , θi j k, . . . , θL×N }.
pi j (t) B target blocking probability for j type of spectrum
band at ith cell during time interval t for the secondary network
operator.
ai j k (t) B unit bandwidth available from kth PNO to be
leased to SNO for jth type of spectrum band at the ith cell
during time interval t, where ai j k (t) ∈ R
L×Ni j
≥0 .
ri j (t) B unit bandwidth required to satisfy the target block-
ing probability pi j (t) for the SNO’s for jth type of spectrum
band at ith cell during time interval t, where ri j (t) ∈ RL≥0.
αi j k (t) B the expected profit for borrowing unit bandwidth
from kth PNO for jth type of spectrum band at ith cell during
time interval t, where αi j k (t) ∈ RL×Ni j .
C. Profit maximisation under restricted budget
In this section, we formulate the spectrum allocation prob-
lem that illustrates how much spectrum bandwidths to be
borrowed from each PNO to keep the blocking probability
in a specific level. Given a set of possible available spectrum
resources {ai j k (t)}, their associated prices {ci j k (t)} and ex-
pected profit {αi j k (t)}, the problem is to find the feasible set of
spectrum bandwidths {xi j k (t)} by maximising the total profit
of the SNO, under allocated budget. Resource acquisition in
this case is obtained by solving the following optimisation
problem:
Problem:
maximise

L∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
N j∑
k=1
αi j k (t) · xi j k (t)
 (1)
subject to
arg min
xi j k ∀i, j,k
Pr
(
λ(t), µ(t), ri j k (t) + wi j
)
≤ pi j (t), ∀i j, k (2)
xi j k (t) ≤ ai j k (t), ∀i j, k (3)
Ni j∑
k=1
xi j k (t) ≤ ri j (t), ∀i j, k (4)
N j∑
k=1
ci j k (t) · xi j k (t) ≤ bi j ∀i j, k, (5)
where αi j k (t) consists of two parts: the expected revenue
vi j (t) and cost ci j k (t), which can be obtained as
αi j k (t) = vi j k (t) − ci j k (t), (6)
where
vi j k (t) = f
(
xi j k (t), θi j k (t)
)
. (7)
Here, we consider the intrinsic quality per unit bandwidth
(θi j k (t)) for each PNO, which can vary, i.e., θi j k (t) Q θi j l (t),
∀i j and ∀k, l with k , l. In this problem formulation, the
parameter θi j k (t) influences the optimal spectrum borrowing
decisions.
Typically, the revenue vi j k (t) earned through the sale of
the borrowed bandwidth must exceed the borrowing cost, i.e.,
vi j k (t) > ci j k (t) due to the assumption that profit of the PNO
for borrowing a unit bandwidth is always positive (αi j k (t)).
The inequality constraint in equation (5) implies that the SNO
maximises its profit by taking into account the limitations
imposed by cost of the utility and the maximum allowable
expenditure which the SNO can spend for borrowing spectrum
demand in each cell. Next, we solve the above non-linear
optimisation problem in two phases:
• Phase 1: Stochastic modelling
The SNO set the target blocking probability for each cell
(e.g., pi j = 0.01, ∀i j ). Then it calculates the bandwidth
ri j (t) required to achieve the target blocking probability
pi j (t) for each cell i. Next, the SNO finds the amount
of bandwidth required to borrow from primary networks.
Blocking probability at the ith cell of SNO can be defined
as
P(b) (t) =
1
ν!
(
λ(t)
µ(t)
)ν 
ν∑
n=0
1
n!
(
λ(t)
µ(t)
)n
−1
. (8)
Now with the initial fixed bandwidth wi j , we first cal-
culate the total required bandwidth τi j (t) to achieve the
target blocking probability for the ith cell of the SNO
τi j (t) = f
−1 (Pr (λi j (t), µi j (t),wi j )) . (9)
where f −1(·) is the inverse function of P(b) (t) (equation
8) used to derive the required capacity over the existing
capacity.
Subtracting the fixed bandwidth wi j from the total re-
quired τi j (t), we obtain the required bandwidth ri j (t) at
the ith cell of the SNO during time interval t
ri j (t) = τi j (t) − wi j . (10)
Now the problem is to find the feasible set of bandwidth
xi j k (t) from the PNOs which minimises the borrowing
cost. This is realised in the next mathematical program-
ming phase. The spectrum demand is adjusted dynami-
cally based on the network information provided by the
expected cell demand, service rate and existing spectrum
bandwidth.
• Phase 2: Mathematical programming
In this phase, we set up the vectors {ci j k (t)}, {ai j k (t)}
and {αi j k (t)}. The borrowing decisions of the SNO
are made subject to achieving the maximum profit for
each acquisition from the PNOs. In this formulation,
the borrowing capacity of the SNO is restricted to
budget allocation bi j . If the acquired resources ai j k (t)
are insufficient to reach the target blocking probabil-
ity pi j (t) (i.e., ri j k (t) − ai j k (t) > 0), then the SNO
borrows from the remaining bandwidths from the set
{ai j1(t), ai j2(t), . . . , ai jN (t)} = ai j k (t) for which the cost
is minimum. If the required blocking probability pi j (t)
is reached, then the SNO stops acquiring new spectrum
bandwidths until the next time interval (t + 1).
Next, we list the detailed procedure in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Optimal spectrum borrowing under restricted
budget
1: Initialisation: Number of cells in the network = L,
number of operators in the network = N and number of
types of spectrum bands = M .
2: Calculate ri j ∀i, j which satisfies pi j , and get ci j k , ai j k ,
αi j k and θi j k (t) ∀i, j, k.
3: Set maximum allowed budget expenditure for every cell
bi j .
4: for every time slot (t) do
5: for all cells i ← 1 : L do
6: for all PNOs k = 1 : N do
7: Solve the nonlinear stochastic Problem s.t. (2),
(3), (4) and (5)
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
11: return
D. Spectrum allocation using random algorithm under budget
constraint
In this subsection, we solve the problem of spectrum
allocation under budget constraint by a random bandwidth
selection algorithm (Algorithm 2). The algorithm performs all
the steps as in Algorithm 1. However, Algorithm 2 does not
perform spectrum selection according to the highest possible
profit combination from the set {ai j k }, rather runs on randomly
selected combination from the set {ai j k } to satisfy the spec-
trum demand ri j . To satisfy the constraints in equation (3), (4)
and (5) we use
xi j k (t) =

ai j k (t), ri j (t) ≥ ai j k (t), bi j ≥ ci j k,
ri j (t), ri j (t) < ai j k (t), bi j ≥ ci j k,
0, bi j < ci j k or ri j (t) = 0.
(11)
Note that when
∑
ai j k ≤ ri j the feasible set {xi j k } is equal
for both formulations. We also note that when
Ni j∑
k=1
ai j k (t) > ri j (t), (12)
the optimal and random algorithm may achieve the same
outcome in terms of total borrowing cost, however, this is a
result of randomness in the selection process with probability
P(selecting optimal bandwidths)
=

1
N
ai j k ≥ ri j ,∀i j
1{a¯i j ..}
∑
m {a¯i j lm, ∀l,m} ≥ ri j ,∀i j
1
∑Ni j
k=1 ai j k ≤ ri j ,∀i j
(13)
where {a¯i j lm, ∀l,m} ⊂ {ai j k, ∀i j , k }, and {a¯i j ..} is the number
of subsets in the set {a¯i j ..} which satisfy the bandwidth
requirement for the ith cell with jth type of spectrum band.
Algorithm 2 Random spectrum borrowing under restricted
budget
1: Initialisation: Number of cells in the network = L,
number of operators in the network = N and number of
types of spectrum bands = M .
2: Calculate ri j ∀i, j which satisfies pi j , and get ci j k , ai j k ,
αi j k and θi j k (t) ∀i, j, k.
3: Set maximum allowed budget expenditure for every cell
bi j .
4: for every time slot (t) do
5: for all cells i ← 1 : L do
6: Set x ← {0N }.
7: Set counter← ∑ x.
8: Choose a random integer n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }.
9: for all PNOs k = n : N and 1 : (n − 1) do
10: if (0 < ai j k ) ≤ (ri j −counter) & (ci j k ∗ai j k ) ≤
bi j then
11: xi j k ← ai j k .
12: counter← counter +∑ xi j k .
13: bi j ← bi j −
∑
(xi j k ∗ ci j k ).
14: else if (ai j k > 0) & ci j k ≤ (bi j − counter) &
(ai j k ∗ ci j k ) ≥ bi j then
15: xi j k ←
⌊ bi j
ci j k
⌋
where bxc means the floor
of x.
Algorithm 2 Random spectrum borrowing under restricted
budget (continued)
16: counter← counter +∑ xi j k .
17: bi j ← bi j −
∑
xi j k . ∗ ci j k .
18: else if counter ≤ ri j & ai j k > 0 & ai j k ≥
(ri j − counter) & (ai j k ∗ ci j k ) ≤ bi j then
19: xi j k ← ri j − counter.
20: counter← counter +∑ xi j k .
21: bi j ← bi j −
∑
xi j k ∗ ci j k .
22: break
23: else if counter ≤ ri j & ai j k > 0 & ai j k ≥
(ri j − counter) & (ai j k ∗ ci j k ) ≥ bi j then
24: xi j k ← min
{⌊ bi j
ci j k
⌋}
.
25: counter← counter +∑ xi j k .
26: bi j ← bi j −
∑
xi j k ∗ ci j k .
27: else if
28: then
29: xi j k ← 0.
30: end if
31: end for
32: end for
33: end for
34: return
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the analysis of optimal borrowing
solutions by Algorithm 1 which describes the profit max-
imisation with restricted budget scenarios. To explore the
advantages of the proposed formulation, we compare the
results from Algorithm 1 with a random spectrum selection
formulation by Algorithm 2. We simulate the functionalities
of the network management which are necessary to generate
the optimal solution and to compare with the random spectrum
selection algorithms. We consider one SNO and four PNOs
(N = 4) to simulate the dynamics of the merchant mode
resource sharing mechanism. Some parameters are determined
randomly by the algorithms with specific distribution (e.g., λi ,
µi , wi) and we control other parameters (e.g., L, pi j ). The
algorithms are tested for different scenarios subject to those
network parameters.
A. Expected profit under budget constraints analysis
The objective of the SNO can be described both from
economic and system performance perspective. Firstly, the
SNO aims to lower the blocking probability for its subscribers.
Secondly, the SNO attempts to maximise its profit by leasing
additional spectrum from the PNOs in terms of cost and in-
trinsic quality. However, since network operators often operate
with limited budget e.g., SNO can only spend bi j (t) amount
of resources/money at a cell i and time interval t. This could
be imposed by the government and regulatory bodies to keep
the fairness of spectrum leasing among network operators.
To demonstrate the gain by the optimal algorithm, detailed
investigation has been made and the results are compared
with the random allocation algorithm (see Figure 2a). The
optimal algorithm shows a substantial gain is achievable in
comparison to using the random allocation approach. However,
both algorithms provide acceptable efficiency in terms of GoS.
We also notice that as the number of cells increase the profit
of the SNO gets larger, see Figure 2b.
We also study how the optimal allocation based on profit
maximisation affects the amount of acquired bandwidths.
With number of cells between 1 − 100, we compare the two
algorithms presented in Section IV, see Figure 3. We find
that, the optimal algorithm can achieve higher number of
aggregated channels due to the higher efficiency in spectrum
borrowing under the restricted budget.
B. Expected profit under budget constraints with multiple
types of band
In the above analysis, we considered only one type of band
(M = 1), which is provided to users at all cells (e.g., 900
MHz). In a more general model, different types of bands (e.g.,
900 MHz, 2.3-2.4 GHz and 2.40-2.4835 GHz) can be operated
by one network operators. Different bands provide different
quality in the mobile broadband services [1]. The measures of
quality include data rate and coverage. Therefore, they cannot
be treated equally. In the proposed algorithm, we added a
functionality to allow the management of spectrum trading
to be more effective by assigning each cell with a particular
band type. In order to quantify the impact of the proposed
algorithms we simulated a network which could support three
different bands, (M = 3). We also tested the algorithms
with two different budgets. In the simulation of 10 cells and
allocated budget of 50 and 500 for each cell, we observed a
markedly increased profit in both cases, see Figure 4. We can
also see from the figures (top and bottom figures) that in all
types of bands, the optimal algorithm outperforms its random
counterpart.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a finite horizon nonlinear optimisation
stochastic program to solve an optimisation problem for
dynamic spectrum sharing. The problem is investigated by
considering a comprehensive process of delivering the SNO’s
bandwidth demand and the solution algorithm ensured that
maximum profit under budget restrictions are achieved. The
SNO aims to achieve a target performance by borrowing
spectrum from other network operators (PNOs) on a temporal
and spatial basis. Results obtained from the proposed model
is then compared with results derived from an algorithm in
which spectrum borrowing is random. Detailed comparisons
are presented and they showed that the gain in the results
obtained from our proposed stochastic-optimisation framework
is markedly higher than random borrowing algorithm. Our pro-
posed approaches facilitate a dynamic purchasing (also called
automation of licensing) scheme for such a complex problem,
which provides incentives to the network operators wishing to
adopt dynamic spectrum sharing as well as substantial benefits
for efficient use of spectrum. This is a natural implementation
of the stochastic and optimisation framework which to the
best of the authors’ knowledge has not been addressed in pre-
vious works in this context. The proposed algorithm showed
significant opportunities to increase spectrum utilisation while
keeping GoS at a particular level and ensuring a higher profit.
We have also shown that our proposed optimisation solution
not only reduce the total borrowing cost of the SNO but also
finds maximum spectrum access under any allocated budget.
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